Stimson Publications on Crisis Management and Confidence Building
With the end of the cold war, confidence-building measures (CBMs) are emerging as an essential means of preventing accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife-ridden regions. The East-West experience is one highly developed example of CBM implementation, but the practice has also been usefully applied in South Asia, the Middle East,and the Southern Cone of Latin America.
This handbook has several purposes. The contributors wish to call attention to CBMs undertaken in a variety of regions. They also wish to call attention to the East-West experience in negotiating and implementing CBMs, not as a guide to action in other regions, but as a useful case study.
Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill, and Jenny S. Drezin, eds., A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security, 3rd Edition (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1998).
When the first edition of the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security was published in September 1993, CBMs were viewed with skepticism in regions that wished to be distant from perceived Cold War constructs. Over time, and with much useful discussion across borders, regions, and cultures, resistence to the theory and practice of CBMs has eased. Greater acceptance of CBMs grew, in part, from acknowledgment that terminology ought not to get in the way of successful practice. And while the term “confidence-building measures” may have been rooted in the Cold War, the practice of tension reduction has been underway in many regions long before CBMs were formally adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
By the time the second edition of the CBM Handbook was published in January 1995, ritualistic arguments over the ‘export’ of CBMs from the North to the South, or from the West to the East were largely over. Proponents of CBMs in the West understood that measures negotiated during the Cold War could not be mindlessly transposed to other regions, while CBM skeptics in other regions began to soften their negativity. While some remained stuck in past grievances, others began to explore how CBMs usefully employed elsewhere might be adapted to meet local needs. The Stimson Center’s publications on CBMs found interested readers in government offices, military headquarters, academia, research institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. The CBM materials on our website evolved and grew. At the same time, significant obstacles to the negotiation and proper implementation of CBMs were quite evident in almost every region. While rhetorical support for CBMs was forthcoming, negotiation and implementation of CBMs lagged behind.
The third edition of the CBM Handbook appears at a time when much work remains to be done on the theory and practice of successful confidence-building. CBMs negotiated during the Cold War have proven to be exceptionally useful and adaptable to an entirely new European security environment—a major success story. There has been considerable progress in confidence-building in most of Latin America, especially in the economic sphere. The institutionalization of discussions regarding CBMs, both official and nongovernmental, is well underway in Latin America and in the Asia–Pacific region. Southern Africa and Central Asia also appear to be moving forward on CBMs.
The Stimson Center is releasing today an essay by Toby Dalton entitled "Beyond Incrementalism: Rethinking Approaches to CBMs and Stability in South Asia." Dalton is the Deputy Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Dalton explores the dilemma of how to pursue peace and stability in South Asia: while incremental steps, intended to foster confidence in small bites, have neither produced stability nor been a "catalyst for change," there appears no viable alternative approach. The essay makes the case for an alternative approach, based on a mix of incremental steps and symbolic leaps, which could produce a trajectory characterized by sustained stability, rather than the current cycle of crisis, momentary progress, then stasis.
Written by P.R. Chari for the Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. Reprinted with permission.
Where is China heading? How will Beijing practice the use of CBMs, which the extraordinary Norwegian peace-maker and strategic analyst, Johan Jørgen Holst, defined twenty years ago as instruments to convey "credible evidence of the absence of feared threats"?
China's economic growth and military potential have commanded the attention of its neighbors, and with good reason. China has fought wars with the United States and Japan, and has clashed with Russia and India over disputed borders. Beijing's relations with all four of these countries remain critical "works in progress." How these bilateral relationships evolve will define key contours of international relations in the twenty-first century.
Chinese views toward the theory and practice of confidence-building measures matter a great deal, which is why the Henry L. Stimson Center has published this first ever English-language collection of essays exclusively on CBMs written by Chinese authors. This volume offers a rare glimpse of Chinese views and thinking on these important issues.
Though more tranquil and democratic than at any point in its recent past, Latin America faces many challenges. The states of the region continue to wrestle with the problems created by extremes of wealth and poverty and by ongoing disputes over territorial claims, resource exploitation, border demarcation, and uncontrolled flows of populations across borders. There are also lingering suspicions created by years of hostility, isolation, and military rule. It is therefore very encouraging that the states of the region are making major efforts to engage each other in new diplomatic efforts aimed at creating a more cooperative basis for international security in this hemisphere. A recent decision by the Organization of American States (OAS) to make permanent a Committee on Hemispheric Security is only one example of these efforts. Other regions in which tensions are rife could profitably review the progress made in Latin America.
The Stimson Center, working together with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) - Chile, co-sponsored a conference of leading academics and military officers to investigate the applicability of CBMs to the security problems faced by Latin American states. This event, held in Santiago, Chile, in August 1992, was notable for the dialogue it inspired and for a number of highly informative papers by regional experts on various aspects of the confidence building. These papers, in updated form, were published in mid-1994 by FLACSO-Chile under the title Medidas de Confianze Mutua en America Latina. In this volume, we present a cross-section of the papers, in excerpted form and translated into English, for a readership in North America and other regions. Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean perspectives on CBMs are represented in this volume, as is the Chilean military view of "The Armed Forces and CBMs in Chile." American experts cover confidence building in Central America and in the Maritime domain.
To this end, the essay looks at the concept of confidence building and how it has been applied in the past in the South Asian context. It then assesses and analyzes the reasons for the only limited success of lndo Pakistani CBMs. We argue that a perceptual blockage and an enemy mythology surrounding both India and Pakistan are the real impediments to the success of CBMs. Not only do they prompt governments of the two states to engage in hostile actions which reinforce the image of an enemy across the border, but they also prevent them from hearing each other's legitimate concerns. This, in turn, contributes to a perpetual state of hostility. The real route to confidence building lies in altering these myths by measures such as improving people-to-people contacts.
It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normalized until the Kashmir dispute is settled. It is no less obvious that the two sides will be unable to tackle this old and vexing issue unless a basic level of normalization has already been achieved. In other words, a measure of confidence needs to be developed through accords on other issues. Such agreements would serve to convince each side of the other's bona fides without in any way compromising its stand on Kashmir.
In this essay, A.G. Noorani suggests three pending issues on the Indo-Pakistani agenda which are preeminently susceptible to a solution in the near future: demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir, the barrage to be constructed by the state government of Jammu and Kashmir on the Jhelum River below Wular Lake, and a demarcation of the Indo-Pakistani territorial and maritime boundaries in the Sir Creek area between Gujarat (India) and Sind (Pakistan).
Each issue lends itself to an approach that blends legal and political considerations. Although each issue is of limited proportions, the impact of a solution to all three points would be significant for Indo-Pakistani relation, imparting momentum to discussions on other confidence-building measures and on the dispute over Kashmir. The only obstacle to such an accord is a lack of political will.
Michael Krepon and Peter Constable, "Confidence-Building, Peace-Making and Aerial Inspections in the Middle East," Stimson Center Occasional Paper 6, January 1992.
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have been defined as "arrangements designed to enhance...assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create". CBMs, by definition, must promote confidence on both sides of any dispute. Non-symmetrical or unilateral measures not acceptable to the other side tend to increase rather than decrease tensions.
If states in the Middle East wish to create facts associated with trustworthiness and peace-making, a wide range of CBMs might be employed to lessen tensions, quiet borders, or introduce a measured degree of transparency that does not impinge on the security of any participating state. A significant number of these measures-some acknowledged, some not - have already been employed in various parts of the Middle East to mitigate the Arab Israeli dispute and tensions in other parts of the region as well.
Was there a near-nuclear war between India and Pakistan in 1990? To help set the record straight, the Stimson Center convened a meeting on February 16, 1994 with US officials who could provide authoritative eye witness accounts of this important crisis.
Occasional Paper 17 is a transcript of this on-the-record discussion which was led by former US Ambassador to India William Clark and former US Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley. Participating in this discussion were the U.S. defense attaches at both embassies, who traveled extensively during the crisis and watched the Indian and Pakistani militaries at very close quarters. We invited knowledgeable Indian and Pakistani officials to join us, as well as South Asian reporters who were based in Washington, DC.
Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia, New York: St. Marten's Press, 1995.
Relations between India and Pakistan are at a low ebb and are likely to get worse. Relations between India and China are improving, but reversals can easily occur. This important and timely volume, the first of its kind, offers concrete proposals to help avert future conflict and to encourage regional cooperation. The authors are drawn from India, Pakistan, China and the United States, with most chapters being collaborative efforts across borders.
To paraphrase Raymond Aron, crises have become the substitute of wars between nuclear-armed states. This corollary to nuclear deterrence applies to South Asia, where Pakistan and India have so far experienced two crises with the advent of covert nuclear weapon capabilities and three more after carrying out underground tests of nuclear weapon designs. One of these crises prompted a war limited in geographical scope, duration, and intensity.
The most recent of these crises was sparked by mass-casualty assaults in November 2008 against iconic targets in Mumbai, including two luxury hotels and the central train terminus. The perpetrators of these attacks were trained, equipped, and directed by handlers within Pakistan. They were affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), an extremist group with ties to Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. The Government of India quickly chose not to strike back against the LeT or other targets within Pakistan. An earlier coalition government in New Delhi showed similar restraint after another extreme provocation in 2001, an attack against the Indian Parliament building and those within it. The perpetrators of the attack on Parliament are widely believed to be affiliated with the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), another extremist group which, at that time, maintained close ties to Pakistan’s security apparatus.
The progression of attacks carried out by Pakistani nationals directed against Indian targets has raised questions about whether New Delhi’s forbearance might be expected to continue in the event of future mass-casualty assaults against iconic targets that can be traced back to Pakistan. This essay assesses the progression of five crises between Operation Brasstacks in 1986-7 to the Mumbai crisis in 2008, looking for patterns, shifts, and implications for crisis management and escalation control.
Well-chosen words delivered in public declarations by national leaders can serve to reassure neighbors, demonstrate good will, reinforce common interests, open lines of communication, break deadlocks, and promote regional stability and security. The first comparative analysis of public declarations ever published, this report concentrates on the mixed successes of declaratory diplomacy in managing troubled bilateral relationships in four case studies: the US-USSR; Egypt-Israel; India-Pakistan; and Argentina-Brazil.
Deterrence between India and Pakistan is becoming less stable with the passage of time and an increase in nuclear weapon capabilities. India and Pakistan have not addressed basic issues in dispute, nor have they agreed to set them aside. Direct trade and other means of connectivity remain purposefully circumscribed, and spoilers who oppose Pakistan’s rapprochement with India are poorly constrained. In 2015, India and Pakistan are no closer to resolving their differences than they were seven years ago, after members of Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out attacks against Mumbai landmarks, including the central train station, two luxury hotels, and a Jewish center.
The essays in this volume highlight how doctrinal, strategic, and technological developments contribute to growing deterrence instability in South Asia. Key elements of Indian and Pakistani strategic culture intersect at times in negative, reinforcing ways. Pakistan and India continue to diversify their nuclear weapon capabilities in ways that undermine stability. Two kinds of delivery vehicles – short-range systems that must operate close to the forward edge of battle, and sea-based systems – are especially problematic because of command and control and nuclear safety and security issues. Taken together, these chapters point to serious challenges associated with increased nuclear dangers unless leaders in India and Pakistan work to resolve their grievances, or consider measures to mitigate their costly and risky strategic competition. If not, deterrence instability on the subcontinent will grow in the decade ahead.
India and Pakistan have developed and flight tested seventeen new nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since testing nuclear devices in 1998 - an average of more than one per year. Military doctrines have also evolved to emphasize more rapid mobilization to engage in limited conventional warfare. Diplomacy to reduce nuclear risks has lagged far behind nuclear weapon-related advances and doctrinal change. Since 1998, Pakistan and India have negotiated four notable military-related Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures. No new measures have been agreed upon since 2007.
There is no basis for deterrence stability on the Subcontinent when diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction are moribund while nuclear capabilities grow and military doctrines evolve. The most desirable off-ramp to increased nuclear dangers is to secure normal relations with a nuclear-armed neighbor. This collection of essays - the product of bi-monthly discussions at the Stimson Center - provides analysis and ideas for deterrence stability and escalation control on the Subcontinent. This pursuit awaits leadership in India and Pakistan that is strong enough to persist in the face of violent acts designed to disrupt progress.
A.G. Noorani, "Easing the Indo-Pakistani Dialogue on Kashmir: Confidence- Building Measures for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek, and the Wular Barrage Disputes," Stimson Center Occasional Paper 16, April 1994.
Anyone who follows the course of events on the India-Pakistan subcontinent will be struck by its utter immunity to the winds of change that have recently blown over theglobe. The former Soviet Union withdrew itstroops from Afghanistan, and the regime it had installed collapsed. The two Germanies reunited ; the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe collapsed, and the Soviet Union itself fell apart. The Israeli-Palestinian accord and the adoption of a constitution for a multiracial democracy in South Africa followed the trend.
Estrangement between India and Pakistan is a disturbing exception to that trend, particularly so because both states possess nuclear weapons capabilities, official denials notwithstanding . Since the end of British rule in 1947, nothing like a sustained period of detente has ever come about on the subcontinent. Rather, adversarial relations have been the abiding norm. In these countries where very large sections of people live in dire poverty, the enormous expenditure on arms and the tragedy of three wars is a testimony to the failure of leadership.
When nations with deep grievances acquire nuclear weapons, tensions increase and their crises become more nerve wracking. It is therefore not surprising that India and Pakistan are traversing a very dangerous passage marked by periods of intense confrontation. Offsetting nuclear capabilities on the subcontinent have made crisis avoidance and conflict resolution more imperative, but also more difficult to achieve.
Nuclear crises are repetitive in South Asia because their outcomes are not decisive, the contestants learn different lessons from close calls, unsatisfactory outcomes are not acknowledged, and new ventures are not foreclosed. Until a process of reconciliation is underway, the next crisis always waits in the wings.
Despite – or perhaps because of – the inconclusive resolution of crises, some in Pakistan and India continue to believe that gains can be secured below the nuclear threshold. Pakistan has sought gains by unconventional methods. New Delhi is now contemplating gaining advantage through limited war. These tactics reinforce each other, and both lead to dead ends. If the primary alternative to an ambiguous outcome in the next crisis is a loss of face or a loss of territory, the prospective loser will seek to change the outcome. In South Asia, misery loves company.
These circumstances leave much to chance. When unsettled accounts produce yet another crisis, the outcome cannot be confidently predicted. While efforts will again be made to keep the crisis from reaching a boiling point or to prevent unintended escalation, these plans might fail. The unexpected becomes commonplace during crises and military campaigns.
The Stimson Center, which has long championed nuclear risk-reduction and confidence building in South Asia, has now produced the first book on escalation control on the subcontinent. These essays draw on western deterrence theory, but the American, Indian, and Pakistani authors are all keenly aware of the need to differentiate Cold War experience from South Asian realities.
Michael Krepon, Global Confidence Building: New Tools for Troubled Regions, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
After every major war, perverse problems and heady opportunities present themselves in strange and variable mixtures. These conditions have reappeared with the end of the Cold War. Entropic forces coexist alongside integrative trends in economics and communications, while blood feuds proceed concurrently with democratic and market reforms. Under these confusing circumstances, leaders would be wise to use Confidence Building Measures, which consolidate gains while providing buffers against losses. Many tools exist to build confidence in tension-filled regions, such as inviting foreign observers to once-secret facilities, carrying out cultural exchanges, and designing cross-border economic development projects. Global Confidence Building is the first volume to examine the intricacies of confidence building around the world, highlighting both success stories and failures, and looking at crucial works in progress.
This report explores how China and Japan might better employ confidence-building measures (CBMs) as part of their security policies, and suggests ways that CBMs can be used to help resolve disputes in the South China Sea and relations across the Taiwan Strait.
This volume builds on three decades of Stimson research and writing on the threat of conflict in South Asia. Within these ten chapters, authors from China, India, Pakistan, and the United States offer analysis based on their personal experiences and scholarship. We anticipate Investigating Crises will prove useful to policymakers, strategic analysts, and students of the region’s troubled dynamics.
A durable peace appears distant two decades after India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. These tests were supposed to lay the groundwork for deterrence-based stability on the subcontinent. Pakistan and India are not out of the woods – far from it. Future crises lie ahead. The essays in this volume offer fresh analysis on nuclear dangers and crisis dynamics. Our authors consider how crises are triggered, the role played by the media, organizational pathologies of the intelligence and national security establishments, and the severity of “nuclear-tinged” crises.
Edited by Jill R. Junnola
This publication examines functional confidence-building across regions. These essays explore how the concept of maritime confidence-building is being developed for the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as how maritime CBMs have been utilized by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia.
The Stimson Center has chosen the format of investigating regional CBMs in a particular functional area because, while we believe that each region must choose its own model, some security concerns can be found in many regions.
Drawing on the issues of crisis, escalation control, and nuclear deterrence, P.R. Chari undertakes a tour d'horizon of the major Indo-Pak crises in the eighties after a nuclear dimension appeared in the calculus.
By W.P.S. Sidhu, Brian Cloughley, John H. Hawes, and Teresita Schaffer
India, Pakistan and China have negotiated a variety of confidence-building measures (CBMs) over the past decade, but implementation has been spotty, and progress slow. With the flight testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and nuclear testing in southern Asia, existing CBMs are clearly inadequate. The authors of these essays, noted security experts from India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, call for serious consideration of security-related measures directed at the likely causes of miscalculation and nuclear danger on the subcontinent by these three governments. Specifically, they suggest the non-deployment of ballistic missiles, a complete cessation of arms firing across the Line of Control dividing Kashmir, cooperative aerial observation of the subcontinent, and other arrangements to ease tensions.
Dr. W.P.S. Sidhu, currently a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, examines the complex dynamic behind ballistic missile development and testing in South Asia. His essay, "India's Security and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures," reviews three possible scenarios of missile regimes in the region, concluding that non-deployment with associated NRRMs offers the best possibilities for nuclear safety.
Brian Cloughley, a former member of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, discusses NRRMs along the LoC in Kashmir. His essay, "Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in Kashmir," proposes concrete steps to reduce dramatically the level of violence across the Line to foster an atmosphere more conducive to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Former ambassadors John H. Hawes and Teresita Schaffer suggest ideas for "open skies" accords for this troubled region in their essay, "Risk Reduction in South Asia: A Role for Cooperative Aerial Observation?" Their recommendations may appear ambitious for southern Asia, but these practices have already proven their worth in other troubled regions, including the Middle East.
Nuclear competition among China, India, and Pakistan is accelerating with the introduction of new developments in strategic technology, including ballistic and cruise missiles, multiple warhead missiles, and missile defenses. The crisis between India and Pakistan over Pulwama and Balakot, as well as the Doklam crisis between India and China, invite repetition. As diplomacy to reduce tensions is barely visible, Stimson has gathered rising talent and veteran analysts to propose pragmatic, novel approaches to improve ties. The result is the latest book from Stimson’s South Asia Program, Off Ramps from Confrontation in Southern Asia.
India and Pakistan could benefit greatly from the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers according to a report released by the Henry L. Stimson Center. The Stimson Center's report, Pakistan and India: Can NRRCs Help to Strengthen Peace?, was authored by Colonel Rafi uz Zaman Khan of the Strategic Plans Directorate, a joint service body in Pakistan that works on a wide range of policies associated with that country's nuclear deterrent. Col. Khan argues that, “[T]he establishment of NRRCs in India and Pakistan would serve as an effective, exclusive and a dedicated technical means of official communication for exchanging rapid, accurate and factual information.” Colonel Khan, who wrote this report while on a visiting fellowship at the Stimson Center, believes that the NRRCs can serve as a "verification mechanism" for training exercises and strategic deployments. He argues that, while the NRRCs “may thus become the highest-level central coordinating institution for the implementation of confidence-building measures,” they cannot be seen as replacement to political and diplomatic lines of communication. NRRCs should not be viewed as the panacea for crisis management, rather, they are a tool to prevent misperceptions or miscalculations that can otherwise lead to unintended escalation. He writes that, while “the proposal for creation of the NRRCs may appear to be optimistic at this stage," the general concept of NRRCs should form part of the agenda during any future discussions between the two countries.
A new Stimson Center report, “Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia,” recommends specific nuclear risk reduction measures to prevent and reduce the consequences of nuclear weapons’ use in South Asia. The recommendations were developed by distinguished participants from Pakistan and India with extensive backgrounds in crisis management, military operations, diplomacy, and intelligence.
Participants from the region focused on measures that were practical, necessary, and achievable in the near term. They have suggested concrete measures to demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship, including the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers and arrangements to reduce dangers associated with missile tests. Participants also noted the importance of developing a better understanding of each other’s nuclear doctrine and terminology on nuclear issues, as well as steps to reduce the likelihood that terrorists could acquire nuclear material.
The collaborative spirit in which this project was undertaken offers hope that nuclear risk reduction measures can be negotiated and implemented once substantive dialogue between the governments of India and Pakistan resumes.
Jill R. Junnola and Michael Krepon, eds.
This collection of essays examines how CBMs have fared in three very different regions- South Asia, the Middle East, and the Southern Cone of Latin America. These regions have implemented specific "tools" from the CBM toolbox with varying degrees of success. Each of these essays clarifies how prevailing political conditions can either facilitate or confound confidence-building efforts. Domestic factors play a prominent role in determining the success or failure of CBMs.
The littoral states of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea could benefit greatly from the establishment of maritime confidence-building measures, according to a report released today by the Henry L. Stimson Center. The Stimson Center's report, The Lahore Declaration and Beyond: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia, was authored by Rajesh Pendharkar, a serving Indian Navy officer. Pendharkar, writing in an individual capacity, argues that, "[D]espite mutually opposed ideologies, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to create prolonged, successful processes of confidence-building. The same is possible between India and Pakistan. Pendharkar, a Visiting Fellow at the Stimson center during 2002, believes that a multilateral approach to maritime CBMs should precede, and could facilitate, such CBMs between India and Pakistan. Of particular importance, in Pendharkar's view, is the negotiation of an Incidents at Sea accord between the two countries' navies.
Pendharkhar acknowledges that the record of confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan has been "regularly interspersed with confidence-breaking measures." Nonetheless, Pendharkar believes that maritime CBMs may have a better chance of success because the "maritime realm has been the least contentious of the three dimensions of military conflict and because there is a wide scope of non-contentious issues upon which maritime cooperation may be achieved," including search and rescue operations and maritime disaster management.
In the second nuclear age, no less than the first, there are no realistic prospects for banning multiple-warhead missiles. China has started to deploy such missiles, and India and Pakistan are likely to cross this threshold as well. The motivations behind these steps will determine how extensively nuclear arsenals will grow and how pernicious the effects of stockpile growth will become.
Success in dampening the negative repercussions of multiple-warhead missiles will rest on two foundations. The first is improved bilateral relations among the contestants. The second foundation for dampening the negative consequences of multiple-warhead missiles in Asia is to resist a progression from countervalue to counterforce targeting strategies of nuclear deterrence. This metric, as with the willingness to improve bilateral relations, is measurable in several ways, including: the retention of no first use doctrines by China and India; proceeding slowly with limited numbers of multiple-warhead missiles; and being more transparent about strategic modernization plans and programs.
If the growth of warhead totals and missile accuracy presages moves by Beijing and New Delhi toward warfighting strategies of deterrence, then the second nuclear age will become far more dangerous, and prospects for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons on international affairs will be undermined. If decisionmakers in China, India, and Pakistan wish to avoid repeating the missteps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the first nuclear age, they will limit the extent to which multiple warheads are placed atop missiles, they will proceed at a slow pace, and, most important, they will reject the lure and pitfalls of counterforce targeting strategies.
Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds.
The five essays contained in the report focus on the complex triangular nuclear interaction among India, Pakistan, and China. These essays examine nuclear dangers in the region and propose strategies for reducing these dangers through political, diplomatic, and technical means.
This case study is the first detailed account of US crisis management after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, one that will no doubt be amplified by future first-person accounts and the release of additional details. We conclude that this crisis is both unresolved and unfinished, as our title suggests, and that further attacks in India by militants trained in Pakistan are likely. Although the circumstances, targets, and venues of any future attacks may differ significantly, our analysis and conclusions might help inform US planning for and management of resultant crises between the two countries.
We hope that this case study, like our earlier assessment of the 2001-2002 "Twin Peaks" crisis-so named because it featured two periods of high tension sparked by militant attacks, separated by an interval of relative calm-will be especially useful to South Asia specialists, to readers interested in US foreign policy-making, and to those with a particular interest in conflict prevention. This case study is intended to complement earlier accounts and assessments of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
In this study, we focus especially on approaches and mechanisms adopted by American officials after the 2008 attacks, as they tried both to address terrorism-related issues and to steer India and Pakistan away from confrontation. Some of these mechanisms were honed in earlier crises between India and Pakistan, notably the reliance on top-level diplomacy and on the choreography of high-level official US visits to Islamabad and New Delhi with other key capitals. After the 2008 Mumbai crisis, however, information sharing and law enforcement cooperation assumed new importance, and the Bush administration undertook an unprecedented attempt to broker direct counterterrorism cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad.
By Alex Stolar
Pakistan is grappling with multiple crises simultaneously: a political crisis to determine an arrangement of governance in which President Pervez Musharraf seeks to share, but continues to exercise power; a resilient and growing insurgency emanating from Pakistan's tribal belt; and a growing economic crisis. Yet one source of instability in South Asia, Kashmir, is hardly in the news. Islamabad and New Delhi, fortunately, share an interest in avoiding another downturn in bilateral relations.
Michael Krepon and Polly Nayak
The Twin Peaks crisis was prompted by a brazen attack by militants on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi in December 2001. The second peak in the crisis occured in May 2002, with an attack by militants in Jammu. The Bush administration's crisis management effort was central in resolving the Twin Peaks crisis. The lessons learned by US officials, which are recounted in this report, could have lasting value, as another crisis between India and Pakistan cannot be discounted. This Stimson Center report provides an extraordinarily detailed, inside look at the US response to this extended crisis.